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Australia’s Defence:
A Review of the ‘Reviews’
Henry Ergas1
The Australian Defence Force is held in high regard; the Department of Defence
is not. Longstanding concerns about inefficiency, compounded by a succession
of fiascos and bungles, have entrenched the perception that Defence is poorly
managed. Earlier attempts at reform have yielded mixed, often disappointing,
results (see Ergas and Thomson 2011), and the years since 2009 have seen a
series of reviews aimed at improving performance, culminating in 22 defencerelated reviews in 2011–12 alone.
Eight recent reviews deal primarily with the fallout from the so-called Skype
incident at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA), in which an ADFA
cadet allegedly broadcast images of himself and a female cadet engaged in sex.
While those reviews are of considerable interest and potentially significant
consequence, they will not be discussed here; rather, my focus is on the reviews
which go directly to the efficiency with which ‘Defence’ uses resources.2
The most far-ranging reviews are the Audit of the Defence Budget, undertaken
by George Pappas with support from McKinsey and Company (Pappas 2009) and
the Review of the Defence Accountability Framework, undertaken by Rufus
Black (Black 2011). Others, such as the Collins Class Sustainment Review (Coles
2011) and the Plan to Reform Ship Repair and Management (Rizzo 2011), are
more narrowly focused.
Despite the range there are some common themes. Central among these are
deficiencies in Defence’s management systems. Simply put, there are many
plans, but no plan; myriad accountabilities, but no accountability. The result is
a structure in which decisions are poorly integrated and in which individuals,
while they know what they are intended to do, are not responsible for its
being done. Moreover, while the structure generates torrents of data, the sheer
scale and diffusion of information, and the lack of tight connection between
decisions on the one hand and what is measured on the other, further undermine
accountability. Coles, for example, notes an instance in which ‘a junior officer
[was] required to render a very detailed progress report every day which was
1 The University of Wollongong and Deloitte Access Economics; ergas.henry@gmail.com The author is as
usual, greatly indebted to Mark Thomson for our many discussions of these issues. Responsibility for the
opinions expressed lies entirely with the author.
2 Henceforth ‘Defence’ is used in the wider sense of both the Department and the ADF.
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sent to over 100 recipients’, with presumably few reading it, and even fewer
feeling any sense of responsibility for the progress it supposedly tracked.
Adding to the lack of accountability is the reluctance of senior management,
and of the leadership in the services, to use what powers they have to hold
individuals to account for poor performance. The unsurprising consequence
is a chronic failure to exploit opportunities for improvement, accompanied by
periodic instances of acute breakdown.

The Collins Class submarine program: Murphy
was an optimist
Nothing better illustrates the chronic problems than the saga of the Collins Class
submarines, now in its twenty-fifth year. Astutely analysed in Lessons from
Australia’s Collins Submarine Program (Schank et al. 2011), this was a project
which showed Mr Murphy, of the eponymous law, to be an incorrigible optimist,
at least as far as major defence ventures are concerned.
Yet it would be wrong to blame bad luck for the Collins’ difficulties. Rather,
from the start, almost everything that could be done wrong was done wrong. As
the Coles review puts it, ‘the problems originate from the very beginning of the
program when, perhaps without fully appreciating the potential consequences,
the Commonwealth embarked on the acquisition of a submarine which, for
good reason, is quite unlike any other in the world’. Many years later, Coles
concludes, we are still in a situation where ‘despite the fact that virtually all
senior people we spoke to were clear that the Collins Class capability is “strategic”
for Australia, there is no clear or shared public understanding of why this is a
strategic capability nor of the implications this has for sustainability.’
As for acute breakdowns, those too have been in abundant supply, with the
most recent being in September 2010 when the Chief of Navy imposed an
‘operational pause’ on the seaworthiness of the ‘amphibious landing platform’
HMAS Manoora,3 causing a collapse in Australia’s amphibious ship capability.
That collapse, which would have made it impossible for the ADF to respond
promptly to a major disturbance in our archipelagic region, is thoroughly
diagnosed in the review undertaken by Paul Rizzo. The causes, he finds, include
‘poor whole-of-life asset management, organisational complexity and blurred
accountabilities, inadequate risk management, poor compliance and assurance,
a “hollowed-out” Navy engineering function, resource shortages in the System
Program Office in DMO [the Defence Materiel Organisation], and a culture that
places the short-term operational mission above the need for technical integrity.’
3
64

Since decommissioned.

Australia’s Defence: A Review of the ‘Reviews’

Even more disturbingly, the Rizzo review notes that these problems were ‘longstanding, well known to Defence and DMO, and the subject of many prior
reports’. And there are indeed close parallels between the conclusions of the
Rizzo review and those of the 2007 Board of Inquiry into the Sea King accident
at Nias Island, which concluded that the tragedy causing the death of nine ADF
members during the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami was not an ‘isolated
random event’ but due to ‘systemic failings across the ADF and parts of the
Defence organization’ (Royal Australian Navy 2007).

The Pappas review: Linking weapons systems
selection to future military challenges
It is against the backdrop of those grim assessments that the reviews’
recommendations must be seen. Some of those recommendations have been
somewhat overtaken by events. This is especially so for the cost-reduction
recommendations of the Pappas review, which formed the basis of a major
search for savings known as the Strategic Reform Program (SRP), initiated in the
2009 Defence White Paper.
The SRP was somewhat misleadingly cast as aimed at achieving efficiencies. But
rather than increases in defence output per unit of output, much of it, in reality,
simply involved spending less to produce less. As Thomson (2012) shows,
some of the savings targets were more credible than others. Moreover, while
some of the targets (notably for sustainment spending) were achieved, others
(notably for personnel costs) were not, statements by Defence to the contrary
notwithstanding. Be that as it may, the SRP — described in the 2010–11 Budget
as ‘the Government’s key initiative in 2010–11’ — was effectively abandoned in
the 2012 Budget, to be replaced by essentially arbitrary reductions in allowed
outlays.
The Pappas review did, however, also recommend changes to Defence’s
planning and control framework, including a streamlined planning process
and, especially, a tighter integration of strategic planning on the one hand and
capability decisions on the other. Achieving such tighter integration between the
identification of future military challenges and the selection of major weapons
systems has been a central goal of Australian defence reformers since the days of
Sir Arthur Tange (Secretary of the Department of Defence from 1970 to 1979).4
Tange was determined to introduce into Defence’s weapons-acquisition process
4 Tange’s 1973 report, ‘Australian Defence: Report on the Reorganisation of the Defence Group of
Departments’, laid the basis for the fusion in 1976 of the former service ministries into a single department
headed by a ‘dyarchy’ of a civilian Secretary and a military Chief of the Defence Force (CDF).
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the techniques of systems analysis and program budgeting pioneered by Robert
McNamara during his tenure as US Secretary of Defense (1961–68). Those
techniques were, in Tange’s view, crucial to moving away from a ‘requirements’
approach, in which the services specified the weapons systems they intended to
purchase with little or no regard to cost. Rather, Tange insisted, a ‘disciplined’
framework needed to be applied, which balanced system capabilities with costs
and took full account of substitution possibilities between alternative ways of
achieving a military objective. While some progress in this direction was made
in the Tange years and in the subsequent decade, by the late 1990s those gains
had been lost, and capabilities selection had returned to being largely based on
‘wish lists’ and logrolling between the services.
The Pappas report also highlighted the problems that still arise in the actual
acquisition of capabilities, including cost overruns and serious delays. The
formation of the Defence Materiel Organisation in 2000 as a separate, specialist
acquirer of defence materiel and sustainment services on the services’ behalf was
intended to put acquisition on a commercial basis. Subsequent reviews, notably
by Malcolm Kinnaird in 2003 (Kinnaird 2003) and by David Mortimer in 2008
(Mortimer 2008), brought new disciplines to the acquisition process, including
a two-stage review process before major programs proceed. Nonetheless, Pappas
shows, cost overruns and delays persist, with the greatest problems being in
projects that involve systems especially built for, or extensively customized to,
Australian conditions. In the light of those problems, Pappas, echoing an earlier
recommendation by Mortimer, recommends that all ‘customised’ solutions be
subjected to rigorous cost-benefit testing compared to a military off-the-shelf
(MOTS) alternative.

The Black review: Accountability and contracts
The Black review takes Pappas’ emphasis on improved planning and control and
pushes it considerably further. While the Black review is littered with deplorable
management jargon, at its heart is a sensible attempt to deal with three principal/
agent problems that are of central importance to defence efficiency. These are
the relations between the government as the principal and Defence as its agent;
between the Department as the principal and its staff as the agent; and between
each of the military services as the principal and the support services of the
Department and DMO as their agent. In each of these, Black proposes ways to
clarify expectations, improve the measurement of performance and enhance the
incentives for success.
Specifically, Black notes that while Defence has myriad plans, and a complex,
multi-tier planning process, it lacks a corporate plan. Rather, it has a Defence
66
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Management Finance Plan, which, in practice, is an amalgam of a range of standalone plans, often prepared by individual fiefdoms within Defence, with targets
for the current year and projections four to 10 years ahead. In contrast, Black
proposes an overarching annual corporate plan that would set out succinctly
the guidance for the Department, including the (preferably quantified) targets
it would achieve. This would both allow better monitoring of Defence by the
government and Parliament, and allow improved communications of priorities
within Defence itself.
Such a plan, Black suggests, would be naturally linked to the objectives set for
individual units within Defence, and hence would inform a cascading series of
targets and associated performance indicators, reaching down to individuals. It
would, in this way, help address principal/agent issues within Defence, though
Black notes three additional prerequisites for enhanced accountability. First, the
current structure of management by committee, which diffuses responsibility
and excuses poor performance, must be replaced by a system in which major
decisions are associated with a clearly identified individual decision-maker.
Second, the practice of frequent rotation, which results in uniformed personnel
shifting jobs every two years or so, needs to be replaced by an arrangement which
provides sufficient stability that performance can be assessed, accompanied by
opportunities to develop and exploit specialist skills in areas such as project
costing and delivery. Last but not least, there must be real rewards and penalties
associated with individual performance, though Black emphasises (and, in my
view, somewhat exaggerates) the constraints imposed by the Public Service Act
1999 and by the regulations made under the Defence Act 1903 (which apply to
members of the ADF).
Finally, with respect to issues between the three services and the procurement
and support arms of the Department, Black proposes substantial reforms to
the existing system of performance agreements. While these generally include
targets and associated metrics, Black finds that the metrics rarely allow timely and
effective monitoring of outcomes. Additionally, Black notes that the agreements
neither include unit-cost information nor allow for trade-offs between unit cost
and capability. Black recommends that the agreements be structured in a way
that both informs and permits such trade-offs, presumably along with some
mechanism for the sharing of gains. This would help move these agreements
closer to customer/contractor relationships in the commercial world.
There is much to commend in these recommendations. But there are also inherent
limitations. Black, for example, greatly overestimates the power of ‘contract
like’ mechanisms within what remains a centrally planned economy, with no
scope for contestability, few tools for price discovery, and far weaker incentives
to seek gains than to avoid losses. Moreover, long experience in Defence itself
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shows that developing the kinds of contracts Black recommends is as costly and
time-consuming as it is technically challenging, though that is not to say a move
in that direction could not yield net gains.5
The greatest weakness, however, lies in the failure of the reviews to address
this question: how it is that the difficulties have proven so persistent in the face
of determined reform efforts. There is, in these reviews, a startling absence of
historical perspective: each does a good job of addressing its remit; but none
asks why previous, no less competent, reviews did not succeed.
The most natural response to this question would be in terms of the phenomenon
Sigmund Freud, in his famous essay on ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, termed
‘repetition compulsion’: the tendency in neurosis to repeat behaviour, even
when it repeatedly leads to failure.
In the mind of the neurotic, Freud stressed, the mere fact of repetition gives
behaviour a degree of legitimacy, an element of predictability and routine,
which helps control the external world and is preferable to the pain and stress of
breaking out of the cycle of failure. Like individuals, public-sector institutions
suffer from behavioural pathologies — pathologies made all the more durable by
the fact that, unlike firms in the private sector, those institutions are not subject
to displacement by more effective competitors. Moreover, the fact that success
and failure are so difficult to measure, and that assessments can be so readily
fudged, only exacerbates the problems. The inherent tendency of bureaucracies
to indulge in ‘group think’, to suppress the awareness of difficulties, to convert
attitudes into hard and fast organisational cultures, and to treat dissent as
disloyalty, then helps ensure that what has failed once will fail again and again.
There are certainly elements of this in Defence, perhaps to an even higher degree
than in other areas of public administration. But Defence’s difficulties in recent
years stem less from those pathologies than from the evolution it has undergone.

‘Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold’
Without trying to fill in the details, a sketch of the relevant story could run
along the following lines.
Subsequent to the Tange reforms of the 1970s, Defence entered into a long
period of retrenchment, in which defence spending grew very slowly, if at all.
Indeed, as Thomson (2012) points out, the defence budget, measured in real
5 Writing commercial contracts for the relevant services will usually be very difficult. Yet it remains desirable
to try to travel in that direction, as it forces Defence to try as hard as it can to specify mutual expectations. But
the journey is, perhaps, more valuable than the destination.
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terms, was greater in 1985–86 than it was a decade later. The result was a force
whose capabilities were extremely limited, as became painfully apparent in the
Timor intervention of 1999–2000. That intervention acted as a wake-up call
to the Howard government, which began a process of increased spending that
accelerated with the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The ADF expanded
by about 20 per cent; defence spending in real terms grew by over 3 per cent
annually, so that the defence budget (again, in real terms) increased from $17
billion at the end of the 1990s to $27 billion in 2009–10; and a slew of new,
extremely sophisticated equipment was brought into service.
All this allowed substantial increases in capability. Indeed, it is difficult to
believe the ADF could have sustained the range and tempo of operations in
which it has since been involved without the post-1999 expansion. Yet those
increases in capability were extremely uneven, with far greater improvements in
the Army than in the other services. And the management processes in Defence
itself failed to keep up with the greater scale on which Defence operates, the
greater complexity and cost of the platforms it operates, and the greater demands
of accountability being placed on government departments generally. Overall,
the centre did not prove strong enough to control the greatly scaled-up parts,
leading to a complete mismatch between promises and achievements.
The extensive reorganisation and outsourcing of tasks undertaken in the Defence
Reform Process (DRP) of 1997–99 contributed materially to the severity of the
problems that mismatch eventually created. The DRP had three consequences.
First, it led to a significant loss in technical capability, as too little attention was
paid to ensuring sufficient skills were retained within the ADF for it to fulfil
its core responsibilities. Second, the DRP introduced a corporate model based
on the centralised provision of core services, but without the processes needed
to manage shared services in the highly complex matrix structure of Defence.
And third, the DRP failed to put in place the management accounting systems
that would allow cost control and could provide a basis for determining and
monitoring outcomes.
What might otherwise have been mere weaknesses thereby became crippling
structural flaws. An unduly ambitious procurement program added to the
difficulties, as commitments to new platforms exceeded the capacity of DMO
to manage, of industry to deliver and, ultimately, of the government to fund.
To this unhappy mix, the election of the Rudd government brought new woes,
as that government, with its expansive vision of Australia’s role, was as willing
to make bold commitments to ends as it was reluctant (and ultimately unable)
to commit the requisite means. That gap, most manifest in the wake of the
2009 White Paper (Department of Defence 2009), led to an ever greater tension
between goals and resources, which transformed long-running problems into
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crises. As these broke out, the government responded through a sequence of
reform programs that any organisation would have found difficult to absorb and
implement, much less one with as weak a corporate centre as Defence.
And that is the nub of the problem. Lasting reform is impossible unless it greatly
strengthens Defence’s corporate centre, in terms of its ability to challenge
the services — for instance, on capability decisions — develop meaningful
plans, and monitor and enforce outcomes. That was always a problem with the
Department: unlike McNamara, who had greatly strengthened the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Tange managed through sheer intelligence and
force of personality. The result was that while the US OSD was able to force the
services to substantially lift their game, its Australian counterpart was far too
weak to do so.
As a result, even by the 1980s, it was apparent that the corporate headquarters
function in Defence was unable to achieve Tange’s goal of imposing ‘a disciplined
relationship between strategy and force structure within the constraints of what
is financially feasible’ (Tange 2008: 22). And here too the DRP, in its quest to
avoid duplication, made matters worse by removing that element of review
and criticism of the services’ capability wish lists that civilian analysts had
previously provided.
But none of the proposals advanced in the reviews tackle head-on the need
to significantly strengthen Defence’s corporate centre, nor has the government
shown any appreciation of its importance. It is therefore difficult to see how the
sensible outcomes of these reviews could be successfully implemented in their
substance; rather, merely being adhered to in their form (as has happened to so
many reform proposals in the past).
There is every risk that the proposals advanced in these reviews will go that
way. That would be a pity, for they reflect a mass of careful, considered work.
But then again, so did their predecessors.
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